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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to document and study the evaluation performed to 
minimize the workload of the new EA-18G crew vehicle interface design prior to flight 
testing the aircraft system.  The EA-18G concept was selected, from options presented in 
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) commissioned by the United States Navy, to replace 
the aging EA-6B Prowler.  As part of this analysis the Navy expressed concern of aircrew 
workload increasing due to the reduction of aircrew in the cockpit, from four to two. 
 The Boeing Avionics Integration Team, in St. Louis, Missouri, developed the 
design interface for the EA-18G through a series of Design Advisory Groups (DAGs) 
consisting of test and fleet aircrew from the F/A-18 and EA-6B communities.  As the 
design of the crew vehicle interface was developed it was implemented in the Network 
Centric Operations Center (NCOC) 3 simulator for evaluation by aircrew.  Four workload 
assessments were performed over a one year period, evaluating multiple operator tasks, 
during simulated missions in various areas of the world.  The crew vehicle interface 
design was altered following each assessment, in order to enable the aircrew to perform 
the next set of simulated missions with increased system functionality and lower operator 
workload.   
 The design, as implemented in NCOC 3 for the fourth assessment, was not 
functional enough to allow the aircrew to truly evaluate the system for a valid workload.  
A fifth workload assessment was added to the program following an inconclusive 
evaluation at the fourth workload assessment.  The design was finalized and the simulator 
was programmed to resemble the completed paper design.  In addition to the finalized 
design, the Human Factors Engineering team, working with the Crew Vehicle Interface 
team, utilized a new method of flight testing to gather metrics, which the workload 
assessments could then be compared to during the final evaluation.  This new method of 
Use Cases allowed the engineering team to evaluate the design based on aircrew designed 
metrics for different missions and task subsets. 
 In the opinion of this author, although the design of the EA-18G will reduce the 
number of aircrew in the cockpit, the design lends itself to a more user friendly and low 
workload interface.  While simulation will never replace the true reactions and workload 
v 
experienced by aircrew during real combat conditions, the implementation of advanced 
simulation techniques in this design has given the Navy insight into the crew vehicle 
interface performance of the EA-18G system earlier in the developmental cycle than ever 
before. 
vi 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Designing aviation systems in the past involved building aircraft around the 
general principles of aviation and physics, answering the question of “how will the 
aircraft fight at high rates of acceleration and airspeed” and then providing simple 
instrument gauges for the pilot.  As aviation systems become more advanced with the 
new technologies available today, crew vehicle interfaces on these new systems have the 
potential to be overwhelming to the operator.  Aircraft crew vehicle interfaces have 
surpassed the older gauge and dial instruments that presented information to the aircrew.  
In the current methods of design, engineers that have never used a system in combat are 
designing interfaces that war fighters will be utilizing in high stress environments on a 
daily basis.  It has become even more important for aircrew to become involved early in 
the design of these new interfaces to ensure that the requirements for an acceptable 
workload environment are addressed in the design correctly.   
 The EA-18G program took the approach of evaluating the crew vehicle interface 
design early in the program with a variety of aircrew evaluations.  Through the process of 
multiple aircrew advisory groups, aircrew were given the opportunity to evaluate the 
design recommendations not only on paper but also as coded in the Network Centric 
Operations Center (NCOC) 3 EA-18G simulation.  These evaluations allowed aircrew to 
address the requirements to present the information needed to perform the Electronic 
Attack (EA) mission in the most appropriate and acceptable workload way for the 
operator.   
 This paper summarizes the results of the human factors evaluation of the aircrew 
workload with the EA-18G crew vehicle interface design.  The issues addressed include 
the comparison of crew vehicle interfaces, accurate measurement of workload analysis 
and the results of the workload analysis performed using advanced simulation.   
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Chapter 2: Aircraft System Background 
ELECTRONIC ATTACK MISSION  
The EA mission consists of denying, degrading or exploiting the enemy’s use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum. This is done by intercepting, analyzing, jamming and 
destroying enemy radar and communication systems. EA is accomplished with the use of 
the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pods, each with two transmitters, that vary in 
frequency range output. In addition, the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile 
(HARM) is used to target and destroy enemy radar systems. When the aging E/F-111 
aircraft was retired by the U.S. Air Force, the EA-6B became the primary EA platform 
for all NATO forces.   The Navy recently upgraded the EA-6B to incorporate the new 
ALQ-218 receiver set on the Improved Capabilities (ICAP) III system.  With this 
successful program, the Navy has paved the way to a more successful integration on the 
EA-18G.  
EA-6B DESCRIPTION  
 The EA-6B (Figure 1) is a four-place, twin-engine, mid-winged monoplane 
designed for carrier based operations. Grumman Aerospace Corporation based the design 
of the EA-6B on the A-6 Intruder for the EA mission. The aircraft is an integrated 
electronic warfare system, combining long-range all weather day and night operations 
with advanced electronic countermeasures. The crew is comprised of a pilot and three 
Electronic Countermeasure Officers (ECMOs). The crew is seated side-by-side in tandem 
with pilot and ECMO 1 in the forward cockpit and ECMOs 2 and 3 in the aft cockpit. 
This side-by-side seating arrangement in the forward cockpit was designed for maximum 
comfort, visibility and crew coordination.  A detailed description of the EA-6B can be 
found in the EA-6B ICAP II and ICAP III NATOPS Flight Manual (Reference 1).  
EA-18G DESCRIPTION 
 The EA-18G design is based on the integration of the ICAP III Airborne 
Electronic Attack weapon system and the F/A-18F airframe systems.  The F/A-18F is the 
two seat model of the Super Hornet and is configured with tandem cockpits (Figure 2). 
The rear cockpit can be configured with a stick, throttles, and rudder pedals (trainer  
 
FIGURE 1: THREE VIEW OF THE EA-6B AIRCRAFT 
 
Source: NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model EA-6B Block 89A/89/82 Aircraft, NAVAIR 
01-85ADC-1, dated 15 April 2004. 
 
 
 
  
 
FIGURE 2: THREE VIEW OF THE F/A-18 SUPER HORNET 
 
Source: NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model F/A-18E/F Aircraft, NAVAIR A1-F18EA-
NFM-000, dated 1 March 2001. 
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configuration); or with two hand controllers, an Up Front Control Device (UFCD) 
adapter, and foot-operated communication switches (missionized configuration).  The 
rear cockpit controls and displays operate independently (decoupled) of those in the front 
cockpit.  The F/A-18F Super Hornet is built by the Boeing McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation based on the F/A-18 design. The F/A-18F aircraft has an internal 20 mm gun 
and can carry AIM-7, AIM-9, and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles; and numerous air-to- 
ground weapons. With the addition of the ALQ-218 receiver pods on the wingtips, the 
EA-18G configuration will not support the AIM-9 missile.  The placement of the 
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) suite (Figure 3) of components in the gun bay location 
will necessitate the removal of the 20 mm gun as well. 
Current plans include retaining all air-to-ground weapon capability that the F/A-
18F has on the EA-18G.  The aircraft fuel load may be increased with the addition of up 
to five external fuel tanks. The aircraft can also be configured as an airborne tanker by 
carrying a centerline mounted air refueling store.  A detailed description of the F/A-18F 
can be found in the F/A-18E/F NATOPS Flight Manual (Reference 2). 
 
 
  
FIGURE 3: E/A-18G AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK SUITE 
 
Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing 
Avionics Integration Team. 
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Chapter 3: System Comparison and Design 
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS 
 ICAP III has three ECMOs that divide the EA mission tasks among each position.  
Each station is equipped with a single Tactical Display System (TDS) (Figure 4) and a 
means of data entry.  The Pilot and ECMO 1 are equipped with a hand controller (Figure 
4), while ECMO 2 and 3 utilize a keypad and slew control (Figure 5).  The slew control 
allows the operator to position the display cursor over any signal of interest, or other 
display item, and hook the signal.  By hooking the signal of interest, the operator 
commands amplifying information to be displayed in the frequency analysis format.   
The ICAP III display formats are divided into six zones of information (Figure 6).  Zone 
1 is designed to display amplifying information for aircraft heading and the current  
  
TDS
Hand 
Controller 
 
FIGURE 4: ICAP III PILOT AND ECMO CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS 
 
Source:  VX-23 ICAP III Test Team, April 2000, NAS Patuxent River. 
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 TSD
Digital Pointing 
Device Control 
Panel
 
FIGURE 5: ECMO 2 AND 3 DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS 
 
Source:  VX-23 ICAP III Test Team, April 200, NAS Patuxent River. 
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Zone 1 
Zone 3 
Zone 2 
Zone 5 
Zone 6 
Zone 4 
 
FIGURE 6: ICAP III DISPLAY ZONES 
 
display format.  Zone 2 displays frequency information on the FR/AZ format and target 
information on the GEO page.  Zone 3 is the primary working/display area for all 
formats.  It displays the frequency versus azimuth and geolocation information for the 
two primary displays.  Zone 4 displays weapon information for any ALQ-99 transmitter 
pod and AGM-88 HARM that are loaded on the aircraft.  Zone 5 displays amplifying 
information on any hooked items from Zones 3 and 4.  Zone 6 is the software control 
stick.   
 The E/A-18G replaces the three ECMOs with one and the single TDS with four 
individual displays; a digital UFCD, two 5” x 5” Digital Display Indicators (DDI’s) and 
one 8” x 10” Digital Display (Figure 7).  There are two types of display formats; 
dependent and independent.  A format is dependent because either the Pilot or the ECMO 
control the same format at the same time.  Because of this, there is a chevron and rocker 
placed in the upper right hand corner of any display that the two operators can be on at 
one time.   
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 FIGURE 7: E/A-18G AFT COCKPIT 
 
Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing 
Avionics Integration Team. 
 
 
 
If the aft cockpit has control, the display will show a rocker (an upside down 
chevron), if the front cockpit has control, the format will display a chevron.  Figure 8 
shows that both cockpits are on the same display format at the same time (the chevron 
and rocker form a diamond in the upper right hand corner).  
Data entry in the EA-18G is divided among two methods, the use of the UFCD 
and the Hands on Throttles and Stick (HOTAS) missionized controllers (Figure 9).  The 
UFCD provides the symbol and character entry method while the HOTAS provides the 
primary method of slew and hook control.  Hooking a signal of interest in the E/A-18G 
also commands the frequency analysis format to be displayed, automatically on the left 
DDI.   
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FIGURE 8: OPERATOR CONTROL SYMBOL FOR DEPENDENT DISPLAY FORMATS 
 
Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing 
Avionics Integration Team. 
 
 
LS3
RS2
RS3
 
FIGURE 9: E/A-18G UFCD AND AFT COCKPIT HOTAS MISSIONIZED CONTROLLERS 
 
Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing 
Avionics Integration Team. 
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PRIMARY DISPLAYS 
 The EA mission requires two key parameters to be performed to accomplish the 
mission, an indication of what frequency the threat system is operating at and a general 
location of the threat.  The ALQ-218 receiver set provides this information to the mission 
computer to display to the operator.  A single dimension display view can not be used to 
display this four dimensional (frequency, three-dimensional location and time) problem 
to the operator, therefore two primary displays are utilized in both designs; the Frequency 
versus Azimuth (FR/AZ) and Geographical displays. 
FREQUENCY VERSUS AZIMUTH (FR/AZ) 
 As the name describes, both designs utilize a single display to provide the 
frequency versus azimuth (Figure 10) indication of the detected threat emitters to the 
operator.  The frequency scale is scalable to all or any portion of the detectable 
electromagnetic spectrum.  Even if the emitter has an actual location (latitude and 
longitude), the azimuth of detection is still presented to provide a steering cue for the 
jamming requirement.  This cue allows the operator to assign jamming assignments and 
determine that the threat emitter is covered by the ALQ-99 transmitter.  The FR/AZ 
format is a dependent format in the E/A-18G and independent in the ICAP III design, the 
display setup is independent while the information for active emitters and jamming is 
reported on all displays.    
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
 In the ICAP III design a geographic display is presented to the operator with the 
threat emitter’s latitude and longitude represented by a character symbol and associated 
error ellipse displaying the potential error in location (Figure 11).  For the EA-18G 
design the same detected signal is correlated into a grouping with other like contacts and 
presented by a symbol where the group is located (Figure 11).  Because there are two 
TSD formats in the EA-18G design (one aft and one forward), the TSD is an independent 
format.  The geographic display provides the operator with threat warning information 
for the striker group as well as the aircraft position.  The pilot and ECMO can both view 
two different displays of information on the same display format depending on the filter 
and declutter settings of the operator. 
      
FIGURE 10: ICAP III AND E/A-18G FREQUENCY VERSUS AZIMUTH DISPLAY FORMATS 
 
Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface 
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 11: ICAP III GEO DISPLAY AND THE E/A-18G TACTICAL SITUATION DISPLAY  
 
Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface 
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team. 
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SECONDARY DISPLAYS 
Secondary display formats provide the operator amplifying information about the 
detected signals of interest, the weapon system status and jamming information.  Each 
secondary format can be viewed while still maintaining situational awareness on the 
primary display of interest. 
SIGNAL ANALYSIS  
 Upon hooking a signal of interest in either design, the operator is presented with a 
signal analysis format with amplifying information of that signal.  ICAP III displays this 
information in the Zone 5 window of the TDS format (Figure 12).  The E/A-18G displays 
this information with the EPAGE on the left DDI (Figure 13).  Each format was created 
to display the same information to the operator in a quick intelligible manner.  The 
EPAGE is an independent format in the E/A-18G design. 
JAMMER MANAGEMENT 
 ICAP III uses the Zone 5 amplifying jammer information format (Figure 14) to 
display all amplifying information about a jamming assignment that have been made or 
requested.  The name and type of jamming assignment, frequency, coverage and ALQ-99 
station where the assignment was made are all presented on these two formats.  The 
jammer management format (Figure 15) is a dependent format in the E/A-18G design.  
By monitoring the jammer management format, the aircrew control the ALQ-99 weapon 
system in order to deny and defeat the enemy radar systems.  In ICAP II and III, jamming 
is assigned through the use of push button actuations on a keypad, while the EA-18G 
design utilizes HOTAS controls to activate jamming assignments.   
STORES MANAGEMENT 
 The ALQ-99 transmitter pods provide the operator with information on what 
jamming assignment has been made and the steering of any particular transmitter.  This 
information is displayed in the Zone 4 of the FR/AZ and GEO formats in ICAP III and on 
the stores management format in the E/A-18G design (Figure 16).  At a quick glance the 
operator can determine what jammer assignments are made to each transmitter, without   
  
Figure 12: ICAP III ZONE 5 EMITTER AMPLYFING INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13: E/A-18G EPAGE  
 
Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface 
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team. 
 
 13 
  
 Figure 14: ICAP III ZONE 3 JAS FORMAT 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 15: E/A-18G JAMMER MANAGEMENT FORMAT 
 
Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface 
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team. 
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FIGURE 16: ICAP III AND E/A-18G WEAPON AND STORES MANAGEMENT FORMATS 
 
Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface 
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team. 
 
ever viewing the jammer management format.  Steering information in ICAP III is 
provided by a graphical footprint on the geographic display format.  In the EA-18G this 
steering information is provided only by the small circle symbology on the ALQ-99 
stores format.  The ALQ-99 information was added to the existing F/A-18F stores 
management format for commonality in stores management across the Super Hornet 
fleet.  The stores management format is a dependent format in the E/A-18G design.   
DESIGN COMPARISON 
 Where the ICAP III design presents all of this information on various areas of one 
or two display formats, the E/A-18G has divided the information into five different 
formats on different displays.  Even with the slight differences in the presentation of the 
information, the E/A-18G formats were created to present the same information in a 
similar and common fashion.   
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This commonality between the designs aided in leveling the skill and experience 
levels of each operator (prior EA-6B operators).  With this baseline in the design, the 
workload analysis became a question of whether this information was presented correctly 
and in a logical manner for the operator to perform the tasks required to accomplish the 
EA mission.   
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Assessment Alternatives 
WORKLOAD 
 Workload can be defined as the measurement of the demand placed upon the 
operator of a system.  There are two types of workload, which play a role in the tasks 
performed by any operator.  The first is physical workload, typically associated with the 
manual labor portion of performing a task (i.e. HOTAS and push button actuations).  The 
operator’s skill or training generally has no impact on how well the task can be 
performed.  The second is mental workload, a more subjective measure of workload that 
relies on the operator’s view of how hard the task was to perform.  It is very difficult to 
evaluate and will vary between operator and tasks.  Mental workload is related to 
subjective states of stress, mental effort and time pressure, leading to breakdowns in task 
performance (Reference 3).  A specific task does not denote a particular level of 
performance or workload alone, practice, fatigue and skill level all play a role (Reference 
3).  While metrics are readily available for physical workload ratings (i.e. heart rate 
variability and blink rate) mental workload is more difficult to determine and more 
subjective.   
 To assess the subjective mental workload of operators, the industry has turned to a 
multitude of techniques.  These techniques fall into different categories, rating scale 
procedures, psychometric techniques, paired comparisons and conjoint measurement and 
scaling.  In order to measure the workload of a system several subjective techniques are 
typically used; Modified Cooper-Harper Scale, Bedford Workload Scale, Rate of 
Perceived Exertion (RPE), NASA Task Load Index (TLX), Defense Research Agency 
Workload Scale (DRAWS), Instant Self Assessment of Workload (ISA), and the 
Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT).  Rating procedures, such as 
Cooper-Harper Aircraft Handling and the Bedford Workload scales, use a decision tree 
process to allow the operator to rate the difficulty of the tasks.  While rating scales can be 
sensitive to different levels and varieties of load, psychometrics have the advantage of 
being capable of providing interval information regarding task difficulty (Reference 3).  
By measuring workload we can ascertain more understanding and meaning from the 
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performance of a task.  Typical variables in measuring workload include task completion, 
time and performance quality (accuracy in performing the task) (Reference 4).     
Traditionally the measurement of operator workload associated with a new system 
under test does not occur until the final design has been implemented in the first test 
aircraft.  With software delivery schedules that bring new functionality to the aircraft 
throughout it’s testing, the full design never receives a full evaluation until the very end 
of the test period, typically when it is too late to change factors in the design that are 
influencing high operator workload.  Most of those items would then be addressed in the 
next iteration of the design and not implemented for months or even years if the 
individual factor was of a low priority.  Multiple workload factors that combine to not 
allow the operator to perform a mission area are often dealt with directly.  Either way, the 
impact to the program has typically been to accept a lower performance level in order to 
maintain cost and schedule.  By evaluating the workload of the EA-18G system early on 
in the design phase, items that influenced the workload were addressed during the design 
phase, before ever reaching the official flight test phase.  This allowed for more 
opportunity to achieve fixes to the design, enabling the chance to deliver better 
performance for the fleet upon initial acceptance of the aircraft system.    
MODIFIED COOPER-HARPER SCALE (MCH) 
 Originally designed to measure the handling qualities of aircraft under test, the 
Cooper-Harper scale uses a binary decision tree to determine the workload required to fly 
the aircraft.  The modified scale (Figure 17) was developed to evaluate workload for 
more generic situations in aircraft system testing.  It can be used for perceptual, cognitive 
and communication tasks (Reference 5).  The scale ranges from 10 to 1, 10 being the 
highest workload.  Studies have been performed involving remotely piloted vehicle 
systems and air defense systems to evaluate operator workload (Reference 6).  The MCH 
can distinguish between low and medium levels of central processing demands and 
“appears to represent a globally sensitive measure as opposed to a diagnostic measure of 
mental workload” (Reference 6).   
 FIGURE 17: MODIFIED COOPER-HARPER RATING SCALE  
 
 
BEDFORD WORKLOAD SCALE 
 The Bedford Workload Scale was designed to identify the operator’s spare 
capacity while completing a task.  The spare capacity is measured through the operator 
following a hierarchical decision tree rating scale (Figure 18), while performing the task.  
The scale ranges from 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest workload value.  Similar to the 
MCH scale, the Bedford workload scale does not have a good diagnostic capability for 
determining why the subjective workload was high.   
RATE OF PERCEIVED EXERTION (RPE) 
 RPE uses a scale from 6 to 20 (Figure 19) that was originally developed for 
assessing physical workload.  The verbal ratings attempt to provide a sense of subjective 
evaluation to the scale.  The scale evaluates the level of workload for physical activity 
(i.e. exercise) by multiplying the rating of perceived exertion by 10, the scale thereby 
roughly approximates the heart rate during exercise.  Due to the physical nature of this 
evaluation technique, it is more suited for the more physical analysis than when 
attempting to assess the subjective workload of a system. 
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 FIGURE 18 BEDFORD WORKLOAD SCALE    
 
 
FIGURE 19: PERCEIVED EXERTION SCALE 
 
Source:  Virginia Tech Army ROTC. http://www.armyrotc.vt.edu/PT/appg.pdf
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NASA TASK LOAD INDEX (TLX) 
 Originally developed by NASA engineers Hart and Staveland, the rating method 
consists of evaluating mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, 
effort, and frustration level with a low to high rating.  The scaling method is based on a 6 
element structured subjective assessment, with an individual relative element calibration.  
Users typically have to be trained in how to fill out the evaluation tools, which can 
sometimes be difficult to interpret.   
At the end of each task, the operator is asked to rate the six dimensions, based on 
their descriptions and what the operator felt was emphasized more in the task (Figure 20).   
After rating each element, the operator is asked to choose what element was emphasized 
more through word pair association.  The word pairs and the original weightings are 
combined to return a workload rating for the task.  The scale, while subjective, is 
designed to balance out the subjectivity of an operator, thereby making it easier to 
compare different subjective operator workloads for a similar task.  
 
 
FIGURE 20: NASA TASK LOAD INDEX RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS (REFERENCE 7) 
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DEFENSE RESEARCH AGENCY WORKLOAD SCALE (DRAWS) 
 DRAWS is a multi-dimensional tool (similar to NASA TLX) that provides a 
subjective assessment from operators.  Rating scales consist of input demand, central 
demand, output demand, and time pressure.  Input demand can be defined as the 
“workload associated with perceiving things” (Reference 8).  Central processing is the 
“workload associated with interpreting information and deciding on an action” 
(Reference 8).  Output is “the workload associated with overt action; and Time, the 
pressure to act quickly” (Reference 8).  Verbal prompts are given to the operator 
following each task and the operator responds with a rating (0 to 100).   The workload for 
each task can then be compared between operators on the 0 to 100 scale.  This leaves the 
operator’s skill and experience level as the determining factor in the required level of 
workload for any given task evaluated.   
INSTANT SELF ASSESSMENT OF WORKLOAD (ISA) 
 ISA is a method which allows the operator to estimate their perceived workload 
during real-time simulations.  At regular intervals the operator is asked to evaluate how 
busy they are on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is underutilized, 5 is excessively busy).  The method 
allows different operators workload to be evaluated for the same task without a particular 
tool (Reference 5).  This method is much more subjective in non-scripted evaluations, 
due to the varying priorities between operators. 
SUBJECTIVE WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES (SWAT) 
 Originally designed to assess aircrew workload, SWAT is a multi-dimensional 
tool that incorporates factors of temporal load, mental effort and psychological stress.  
There are two stages to SWAT; first, the operator ranks the level of the three workload 
scales in order from the lowest to highest, through pair wise comparison (Figure 21) 
before the task is performed and then rates each scale during the task.  While the pair 
wise comparison is similar to that used in the NASA TLX scale there are only three 
factors measured in the SWAT as compared to the six in the NASA TLX scale.  It has 
been said that SWAT is not a very sensitive method of workload rating and therefore can 
be less effective in low workload task evaluations (Reference 9).  
  
FIGURE 21: AN EXAMPLE OF THE PAIR-WISE COMPARISON PROCEDURE  
(REFERENCE 9) 
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Chapter 5: Method of Design and Analysis 
DESIGN ITERATION 
 The design schedule for the EA-18G program was laid out in an iterative 
approach, to allow the software engineers time to design, review and finally code in the 
time allowed in the program, prior to delivery of the first system to flight test.  Design 
Advisory Groups (DAGs) were formed to review the process of the design following the 
contract awarding of the program.  At each DAG, the industry presented design ideas for 
display formats and interface in a power point format, to aircrew from both the EA-6B 
and F/A-18 communities, in order to obtain the operators perspective on the requirements 
for the aircraft system interface.  At the completion of each DAG the aircrew met to 
discuss the changes they would like to see in the design and presented this list to the 
Program Management team for approval.  The changes approved were then coded into 
the NCOC 3 EA-18G simulation for the next workload assessment.   
 The EA-18G design iteration focused on the RADAR jamming portion of EA 
during the first two DAGs (DAG 1 and 2) and the AGM-88 and communications 
jamming portion of EA during the last two DAGs (DAG 3 and 4).  With this breakdown 
in design, changes in the design requested by the aircrew following the first two DAGs 
were fully funded; while allocation of funds was still plentiful.  In contrast, the requests 
made following the last two DAGs were approximately 70-80% funded both due to cost 
and schedule impacts.  In hind sight the program might have suffered functionality 
needed following the later DAGs, due to these funding issues. If these issues were 
addressed sooner, they could have been weighed against earlier requests as higher needs 
and then implemented.  To alleviate this, DAG members rated the higher workload and 
mission impact items higher than other items.  Even with this draw back in funding 
aircrew requests, the program sought to make the changes needed for the aircrew to 
perform the mission, at all costs.  
WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT 
 As a baseline to the effort that would follow contract awarding to design a system, 
that two aircrew could perform the EW mission instead of four, Boeing developed and 
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collected two separate workload surveys.  The first was developed to baseline the 
perceived workload of ICAP II aircrew for the SOJ support mission.  Boeing, working 
with the program office and the EA-6B wing at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey 
Island, administered the survey to 18 fleet Pilots and 21 fleet ECMOs. The second was 
designed to baseline the perceived workload of the ICAP III aircrew for the SOJ support 
mission.  Two Pilots and four ECMOs from VX-23, who had the most experience with 
ICAP III, were given the survey.  The ICAP III survey was not as statistically 
representative due to the ICAP III system still being very new and not yet deployed to the 
fleet.  
The EA-18G program had originally planned three workload assessments at 
various stages throughout the design.  The first assessment was at DAG 2 following 
contract awarding to Boeing and Northrop Grumman.  The DAG 2 assessment was based 
upon a new design that had been scoped back from pre-SDD designs, due to actual design 
implementation in DAG 1.  The industries scoped the interface back in scale from pre-
SDD, due to the amount of funding awarded with the contract (the crew vehicle interface 
that was presented pre-contract, as the design, was not what was presented post contract).  
The second and third assessments followed DAGs 3 and 4 after more of the design 
iterations had a chance to be coded and implemented into the NCOC 3 EA-18G 
simulator.     
Due to the number of changes required following the DAG 2 and 3 reviews, to 
have the design meet the requirements, there quickly became a backlog in the coding 
process for the simulation.  These changes were a combination of items not in the design 
(aircrew inputs) and items that had been misinterpreted in the design and the coding 
process.   By in large, the second group composed the majority of changes to the 
simulation.  As a result, the workload assessment simulation following the DAG 4 review 
comprised of too many errors in the simulation and did not allow the aircrew to properly 
and fairly evaluate the workload during the mission profiles presented.  Another 
workload assessment was added to the schedule following the incorporation of the 
correction of the errors noted during the DAG 4 assessment, along with the final design 
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implementation.  At the time of completion of this thesis, the final design assessment had 
not occurred.   
RATING SCALE  
To evaluate the workload during these assessments, the human factors team for 
the program (comprised of NAVAIR and Boeing human factors engineers) utilized a 
combination of the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) rating and a Modified Bedford 
Cooper-Harper Rating Scale.  The NASA TLX rating was determined to “be more 
sensitive to changes in workload” (Reference 4) while providing a highly reliable rating 
for tasks performed by the operator.  The NASA TLX was thought to provide direction in 
pinpointing opportunities for implementing design changes and automation requirements 
of the EA-18G.  The modified Bedford Cooper-Harper Scale was applied to each 
questionnaire to bound and describe what constituted a workload rating level (Figure 22). 
Each assessment was setup so that the aircrew performing in the simulator had no prior 
knowledge of the real scenario or specific workload tasks involved.  The aircrew teams 
were provided a mission briefing a day before their individual simulation to allow for any 
pre-simulator planning required.  The scenarios used for workload assessments following 
DAG 2 and DAG 3 were the same, using similar tasks and systems, while incorporating 
the improved design features and functionality at each new assessment.  In order to assess 
the impact of pre-knowledge of the scenario for the aircrew in the last assessment in 
DAG 4, the scenario was altered and split into two sections.  In each workload 
assessment the aircrew were given a specific mission to perform; such as stand off 
jamming, close air support, or escort strike, and abort criteria for each mission; such as a 
specific emitter being detected or a popup air threat.  Each scenario covered a different 
mission area of EW that the simulator could perform with the given design at that time 
period.  As each workload assessment was completed, the design functionality increased 
resulting in more of the systems being incorporated for the operator to manage in the 
mission scenario.   
In general the aircrew did not waste valuable response time writing down their 
observations or frustrations during the assessment.  A digital recording of all audio and 
display video of operator actions for each crew station was recorded for post-simulator  
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Excellent 
1 
Low tasking, safe, can accept 
additional tasks without 
impacting existing tasks. 
Good 
No 
Compensations 
2 
Minimal tasking, safe, can 
accept additional tasks 
without impacting existing 
tasks. 
Satisfactory 
without 
Improvement 
(No 
Deficiencies) 
Fair Minimal 
Compensation 3 
Light tasking, safe, can 
accept additional taskings 
with minimum impact to 
existing taskings. 
Deficiencies 
Warrant 
Improvement 
Minor but 
annoying 
deficiencies 
Moderate 
compensation 
4 
Moderate / Comfortable 
tasking, safe, can accept 
additional tasking and 
complete all tasks with 
reduced revisit time.  
 Moderate 
objectionable 
deficiencies 
Considerable 
compensation 5 
Moderate / pressured tasking, 
safety slightly impacted, 
additional tasks will impact / 
degrade existing tasks. 
Adequate 
performance 
attainable 
with 
tolerable 
workload 
 Very 
objectionable 
but tolerable 
deficiencies 
Extensive 
compensation 
6 
High tasking, safety 
impacted, things beginning to 
drop out of scan, additional 
tasking will significantly 
degrade new and existing 
tasks. 
Adequate 
performance 
no attainable 
with maximum 
tolerable 
compensation 
7 
High tasking, safety 
secondary consideration, 
additional tasking will 
override or replaced some 
existing tasks. 
Considerable 
compensation 
8 
Very high tasking, safety not 
factored into tasks 
completion, additional tasks 
cannot be accepted without 
major degradation to all 
existing tasks. 
Adequate 
performance 
not attainable 
with 
tolerable 
workload 
Deficiencies 
Require 
Improvement 
Intense 
compensation 
9 
Saturation tasking, safety not 
considered, scan breaking 
down, additional tasking will 
impact mission 
accomplishment/ 
Not Usable Mandatory 
Improvement 
Major 
Deficiencies 
Intense 
compensation 10 
Total saturation tasking, scan 
and task sharing breakdown, 
fixation on task at hand, 
survival instincts take over.   
Figure 22: MODIFIED BEDFORD COOPER HARPER RATING SCALE 
 
Source: Pre-SDD Phase 2 Final Program Management Review – HFE Workload 
Assessment, Seavers and Perkins, Boeing Avionics Integration Team, St Louis MO 
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play back.  While the aircrew performed their mission, the human factors team recorded 
comments and actions of the aircrew throughout the simulation.  The mission time line 
for each scenario involved triggers for workload tasks that the human factors team 
wanted to see performed.  They consisted of both pre-briefed tasks that went as expected 
and involved novel or unexpected failures.  During the post-simulator debrief the crew 
was provided a NASA TLX questionnaire (see Appendix C for a sample question) and 
asked to fill it out.  The aircrew would first describe their performance criteria for the 
given task and then circle words on the NASA TLX pair-wise comparison table that they 
felt influenced the workload the most.  Definitions of each pair-wise word were provided 
on the same sheet for reference.  Then the aircrew were asked to rate the magnitude of 
each workload factor using the Modified Bedford Cooper-Harper scale for each TLX.  If 
there were any ratings greater than 3 provided in the aircrew comments, they were asked 
to elaborate on what may have been the cause of such a rating.   
In order to jolt the memory of actions performed and frustrations observed during 
the simulation, the crew was provided the capability to view the digital playback 
recording; with audio and video synchronized to each other.  Groups were not allowed to 
interact with each other until after the assessment for that mission task level was 
completed, hoping to not sway comments from any one group.  In addition, the workload 
levels for one team were not known by another until briefed months later.  As the crew 
filled out their individual questionnaire, they also noted any discrepancies in the 
simulation that were not as designed and that may have impacted the workload 
assessment.  These design inconsistencies were taken into account by the human factors 
team during their analysis.   
 During the process of filling out the questionnaires, the aircrew were asked to 
base their answers on whether they had accomplished their task acceptably or not.  
Because the aircrew where not aware of the actual task being assessed prior to seeing the 
questionnaire, there was some subjective interpretation of what was good enough for a 
given task.  After the DAG 3 workload assessment it became clear that the tasks being 
performed were complex and more subject to interpretation.  A workload level for a task 
does not provide useful information if you can not determine if the task was actually 
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accomplished and within a prescribed metric.  Because of this, a set of metrics were taken 
from the Use Cases being developed by the aircrew for flight testing.  The human factors 
team grouped several Use Cases together, in a logical mission order, and determined 
which ones the NCOC 3 simulator could record during an assessment.  This provided the 
capability to compare each operator’s metric accomplishment to each other.  For 
example, if the task was to perform an AGM-88 HARM missile shot on a newly active 
emitter, the time it took to complete that task and whether the shot was taken or not are 
the important factors.  If the first operator, who took 15 seconds to perform the task, rated 
the task a 6 on the NASA TLX scale and another operator called it a 3, and took 25 
seconds, the human factors team could better analyze whether the second operator’s 
rating was lower because they took more time to complete the task or because they had 
more experience with the design.  If both operators took reasonably the same amount of 
time, then the difference was most likely based on the experience level of the operators.  
To help alleviate this factor, a wide source of aircrew were utilized in the assessments. 
COMPILING OF QUESTIONAIRE VALUES 
 After the aircrew provided their comments and ratings on the questionnaires, the 
human factors team compiled the rating numbers and applied the appropriate weighting 
factors for each aircrew and TLX (Figure 23).  The raw rating was taken directly from the 
Modified Bedford Cooper-Harper rating scale values used to rate what influenced each 
TLX.  The weight factor for each scale title was calculated from the pair-wise words 
circled and a total value was found by summing each individual values.  Those scale titles 
that returned higher weighting values were circled more often in the comparison.  Once 
both of these values were calculated, they were multiplied together to return an adjusted 
rating.  The adjusted ratings were then summed and divided by the total weighting value 
to return the specific aircrew workload for the given TLX.  That data from all the 
worksheets were compiled and plotted in graphical format for reporting purposes. 
AIRCREW SELECTION AND PAIRING  
 Aircrew selection for the workload assessments was crucial to obtain a large 
sample source of operators.  Aircrew from VX Developmental Test (DT) squadrons, VX 
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 Scale Title Weight Raw Rating Adjusted Rating (WtxRaw) 
Mental Demand 4 4 16.00 
Physical Demand 0 1 0.00 
Temporal Demand 4 6 24.00 
Effort 2 3 6.00 
Performance 4 5 20.00 
Frustration 1 5 5.00 
 Total 15 Range 1-10   
      
TLX 3-level 1 ECMO 1 composite 4.73 
Figure 23: EXAMPLE OF COMPILED DATA FROM AIRCREW WORKSHEET 
 
Operational Test (OT) squadrons, fleet replacement squadrons, fleet weapon schools, 
F/A-18 Pilots, F/A-18 Weapon System Operator’s (WSO), EA-6B Pilot’s and EA-6B 
ECMOs were all chosen to compile this sample set (Table 1).  Those aircrew from DT 
squadrons had the most experience with testing new system designs and had a baseline 
working level knowledge of how the workload assessment process should work.  The 
remainder of the sample set had only the knowledge gained from the design presentations 
in the DAGs and the training provided the day or two prior to each assessment.  This 
limited knowledge was a concern to program leadership and training took a high priority 
prior to each assessment.  Prior to each assessment there were two days of simulator 
training provided, to allow the aircrew time to assimilate the new design changes and 
help rule out training as a factor influencing the workload assessment.  The Pilot and 
ECMO combination of each crew was organized by an experienced DT aircrew that was 
designated by the program office.  Each crew was grouped together based on prior flight 
experience and time in type model.  Crews that could be composed of operators from the 
same squadron were utilized first, to help negate any aircrew coordination factors that 
might impact the workload levels.   
Another issue for the workload assessments was in maintaining the same 
operators for each assessment.  Due to the turn over in military assignments for aircrew 
and the lengthy time between the first DAG 2 assessment and the DAG 4 assessment, a 
Table 1: AIRCREW PARTICIPATION AND EXPERIENCE 
 
 
Aircrew 
Aircraft 
Experience Hours 
Squadron 
 
Workload 
Participation 
Pilot 1 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1000 
200 
NSAWC DAG 2, 3 
Pilot 1a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1350 
100 
VX-23 DAG 3 
Pilot 2 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
975 
50 
VAQ-129 DAG 2 
Pilot 2a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1430 
60 
VX-23 DAG 3, 4 
Pilot 3 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1560 
150 
VX-9 DAG 2 
Pilot 3a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1300 
140 
VX-9 DAG 3, 4 
Pilot 4 F/A-18A-F 1500 VX-31 DAG 2 
Pilot 4a EA-6B 2050 VX-31 DAG 3 
Pilot 5 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1800 
200 
VX-31 DAG 2, 3, 4 
Pilot F/A-18A-F 1300 VX-23 DAG 4 
ECMO 1 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
No 
Data 
NSAWC DAG 2 
ECMO 1a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
930 
260 
VFA-122 DAG 3, 4 
ECMO 2 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
2200 
400 
CVWP DAG 2 
ECMO 2a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
900 
100 
VX-23 DAG 3, 4 
ECMO 3 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
1100 
75 
VX-9 DAG 2, 3, 4 
ECMO 4 F/A-18A-F 1500 VX-31 DAG 2 
ECMO 4a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
800 
2 
EAWS DAG 3 
ECMO 5 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
2300 
50 
VX-30 DAG 2 
ECMO 5a EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
800 
15 
VX-30 DAG 3, 4 
ECMO 6 EA-6B 
F/A-18A-F 
No 
Data 
VX-31 DAG 4 
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large number of operators left and were replaced.  In order to maintain some data that 
could be compared throughout the four assessments the team tried to maintain a small 
number of crews that had participated in all the DAGs.  TABLE 1 shows as list of 
aircrew that participated in the workload assessments and their flight time in type model.  
A mix of fleet experienced F/A-18 and EA-6B aircrew was requested for each workload 
but not always achieved.  Anyone with more than 500 hours in type is assumed to be fleet 
experienced.   
TASK MANAGEMENT  
 Iani and Wickens (Reference 10) describe several factors that affect aircrew task 
management in aviation.  These are described as task complexity, cognitive or attentional 
tunneling, task importance, and physical salient (Reference 10).  As the workload 
assessments continued throughout the design process, the task complexity in the 
simulator increased.  New functionality was added and higher level tasks could be 
evaluated by the human factors team.  Each workload assessment was performed during a 
two day period.  The first day the crew would be asked to perform the mission at one task 
complexity level and the next day the same scenario with different, higher level tasks, 
would be performed.  The first day’s assessment would be fairly simple in order to 
provide a baseline for the new design functionality.  The final CVE 1 is planned to be a 
four hour extended mission during one day, with increasing task workloads. 
By not briefing the aircrew on all of the tasks to be evaluated during the mission, 
the human factors team attempted to reduce the cognitive tunneling that can occur during 
the performance of a task.  Iani and Wickens describe cognitive tunneling as “the 
compellingness, and not necessarily the complexity, of the task at hand may decrease the 
awareness that other tasks need to be performed in general, and decrease our ability to 
notice cues signaling the need to switch to another task” (Reference 10).  Aircrew, who 
had experience in EW, were left to their own decision process to prioritize what tasks 
needed to be performed (task importance), rather than try to meet the objectives of the 
workload assessment.  This allowed the human factors team to separate any undue 
induced pressure of task completion from the assessment. 
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To simulate as real of an experience as possible during the workload assessments, 
the human factors team used prior aircrew on the Boeing simulator team, to provide 
scripted radio calls during the event.  This, plus the added benefit of a dome simulator 
that could project a realistic simulation of flight, and a scripted scenario aided in 
producing controlled physical salient.  During certain assessments, a negative salient was 
introduced when the simulator system crashed.  The crew would be through half of the 
mission and because of the design of the scripted mission it would have to be restarted.  
This occasionally introduced a certain amount of bias due to the aircrew knowing what to 
expect during the second run at the scenario.  Any trigger that had been unexpected 
previously was adapted to and was overcome more easily.  Recommendations were made 
to script future scenarios in a way that they could be restarted at any point if the simulator 
crashed. 
SCENARIO TASK DEFINITION  
 The human factors team developed a set of critical mission tasks for evaluation 
(Appendix E) through out the design phase. The scenario for each workload assessment 
was then defined as the series of these tasks and events that were required to complete 
that specific mission.  The mission scenarios were derived by EW subject matter experts 
and approved by the program manager.  Pre-SDD paper surveys of the ICAP III and II 
systems were based on the standoff support mission. DAG 2 and 3 focused on the Stand- 
off Jamming mission and the system capability to manage detected threats.  DAG 4 
focused on the Modified Escort and Close Air Support scenarios.  These mission areas 
were derived from the standard areas that EA-6B aircrew train in the fleet to help 
alleviate and issues of the aircrew not having experience in a particular mission area.    
 As part of each of these different mission scenarios, a set of NASA TLX tasks 
were comprised for a specific time interval during the mission.  The operator was 
required to key into the additional tasks in this set while still performing the base tasks 
required for completion of the mission.  Tables B1 through B6 show these individual 
tasks for each workload assessment.  The workload assessments were run at multiple 
levels of difficulty.  The first assessment of a crew for the particular mission was at an 
induced lower level of workload and then raised for the next level.  Therefore the higher 
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level number represents the attempt to induce a higher workload.  The human factors 
team increased the level of workload by inducing faults and failures into the system that 
the operator had to work around to perform the task set.  They also applied external 
environmental cues to the operator to create a perceived urgency while performing a 
specific task.   These injected faults and cues also provided the team with the ability to 
evaluate whether the cue was sufficient to notify the operator when a issue of importance 
was present.   
USE CASE METRICS 
Use Cases have been present for a number of years in the software development 
field.  The EA-18G program set out to develop Use Cases as a means to better combine 
the efforts of the developmental and operational test squadrons during flight test.  
Tactical Use Case’s were written to provide a more mission relatable method of testing to 
developmental test planning and execution, while still addressing the specifications 
required for the aircraft system.  While developing the set of Use Cases the flight test 
team will utilize in later test, a set of metrics were developed for each Use Case to 
provide data and relevance to the test.  In the development of these metrics it became 
obvious, as it had in the workload evaluation, that workload estimates of actions 
performed by the operator without an end result of how to determine the action was 
completed successfully, would leave open questions of whether the workload rating was 
valid or not.   
Each Use Case was developed to be a set of actions that an operator would have 
to perform for a task, given a specific vignette, in a mission area.  Vignettes were defined 
as a set of specific operational conditions sufficient and necessary to support an 
appropriate level of analysis or assessment and, typically, a segment of a mission phase. 
The mission areas that the vignettes consisted of were taken from the common set of 
areas to which the EA-6B aircrew train and fight.  The particular actions were written in a 
general form that did not specifically lay out how to perform the task just that the task 
had to be performed (Figure C1).  An example of this, is do not tell the operator to press 
push button 5 to activate the audio capability of the receiver set, instead it was stated 
“Evaluate Scan Rate and Scan Type using AUDIO function as required”.  This allowed 
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for a better evaluation of the functionality and less of the software logic used to perform 
the function.   
While some metrics (Figure C2) put in place for the Use Case’s came directly 
from the specifications provided for the program, a large portion of the specific tasks 
were not covered.  The Use Case team developed additional metrics based on input from 
fleet experienced aircrew who knew the specific mission areas.  These metrics, while not 
binding to the contractor, enabled the test team to use a mission relatable set of metrics 
for testing.  Because the Use Case team was developing the Use Cases in parallel with the 
workload assessments, the Use Cases were not utilized until the final workload 
assessment, slated for September 2005.   
The human factors team chose sets of the Tactical Use Cases that would relate to 
the full length mission during the final workload assessment and grouped them together 
to create a timeline of tasks.  They determined how to utilize the functionality of the 
NCOC 3 simulation hardware and observation tools to capture the various metrics.  Some 
metrics were determined to be flight test only, while others could be captured using 
various different methods, while some only with the use of the NASA TLX scale.   
 36 
  
Chapter 6: Results 
ICAP II SURVEY RESULTS 
 The workload assessment survey for the ICAP II system returned results showing 
that the highest workload was for the ECMO performing front seat tasks (Figure 24).  
When this result is taken in context of what tasks the front seat ECMO performs, 
situational awareness becomes the largest impact to workload.  With no front seat display 
to provide the ECMO 1 information on what is going on in the mission at any on time.  
They have to rely on feedback from the backseat.  Temporal and performance were the 
two largest influences to the aircrew tasks assessed in the survey.    
 The pilot’s workload increased for the descent to HARM launch because of the 
mental and temporal demand increase in flying the aircraft to the designated launch point.  
The recovery TLX also increased due to the physical and performance increase of 
landing a jet aircraft on the pitching deck of a carrier.  The survey provided results as best 
recalled by the operators involved with no simulation of events.  Because of this, there is 
some bias to be accounted for from the memory of the operator.  The tolerance could be 
as much as ± 1.0 difference in the resultant workload rating.  Overall, the workload 
survey did provide a baseline workload for the program that was within 1.0 of the minor 
compensation level.   
ICAP III SURVEY RESULTS 
 The ICAP III survey was given to DT and TO aircrew prior to the programs 
operational evaluation.  During this time the design implementation was riddled with 
system performance issues.  This was listed as a causal factor in the higher workload 
ratings for the survey (Figure 25).  In particular, the Geolocation issues, the program was 
suffering at the time, making reactive jamming difficult to manage, causing the TLX 
rating to be very high.  The aircrew rated temporal and frustration as the two highest 
influences to completing the reactive jamming task successfully.  Because both the ICAP 
II and III designs utilize four aircrew to perform the EW mission, the difference in  
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Figure 24: ICAP II WORKLOAD SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 
ICAP III Average Composite Rating by Task
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Figure 25: ICAP III WORKLOAD SURVEY RESULTS 
 37 
  
 38 
  
 
workload rating can be attributed to operator training in workload evaluations.  Fleet  
operators, those questioned in the ICAP II survey, are accustomed to compensate for  
difficult tasks and therefore do not see tasks as being difficult, they are used to dealing 
with the issue of poorly designed systems.  DT and TO test aircrew are trained to 
evaluate while ignoring compensation.  If the task is difficult they will rate it as such and 
suggest changes to lower the workload.  Aside from the issues of reactive jamming, the 
other TLX ratings were still within only a 1.0 difference in the workload rating.  The 
ICAP III survey provided a baseline workload rating for the EA-18G design in which to 
be compared.   
DAG 2 LEVEL 1 
 The DAG 2 workload assessment was the first look at the workload for the DAG 
1 design iteration in NCOC 3.  The design was fairly simple involving some signal 
analysis and jamming tasks.  The level 1 assessment (Figure 26) concentrated on the 
jamming tasks with minor system failures.  The result was an overall workload 
assessment of 4.0 or less.  Some improvements were noted in the design that would 
reduce the workload rating for all the areas of concern, but especially status monitoring 
and jamming.  Each crew of operators were told to divide the tasks among themselves for 
the given mission.  During the level 1 assessment, the pilots shared in the jamming tasks 
by trying to jam from the front display set.  This was determined to be not as easy to 
perform as from the backseat because it caused the pilot to be more heads down than 
normal to fly the aircraft.  As a result, the pilot and ECMO workload rating for the 
jamming tasks ended up being about the same.  Overall, the jamming tasks were a 
slightly higher workload rating than the baseline ICAP II survey presented.   
DAG 2 LEVEL 2 
 During the level 2 assessment (Figure 27), the scenario was designed to include 
and evaluate the impact of failures on the design.  Because of the issues the pilots had 
during the level 1 assessment they ended up shedding some of the jamming tasks to the 
ECMO.  This, combined with the design issues of noticing and then dealing with the  
  
FIGURE 26: DAG 2 AVERAGE LEVEL 1 TLX 
Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew 
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 27: DAG 2 AVERAGE LEVEL 2 TLX 
Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew 
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005 
 
 39 
  
 40 
  
induced system failures, increased the workload rating for the ECMO.  At the same time, 
the pilot workload rating decreased due to the shed tasks to the ECMO.  The overall  
margin of the highest workload rating to the level of significant compensation was 
decreased.  Mental, temporal and performance ratings influenced the overall workload 
ratings more than any other from the level 1 assessment to the level 2 assessment.   
DAG 3 LEVEL 1 
 The DAG 3 scenario was focused around the SOJ mission.  Due to the time 
between the DAG 2 and 3 events a small turnover in aircrew performing the workload 
assessments occurred.  Because of this, there were aircrew that had never seen the design 
before arriving to the assessment so a short training period prior to the workload 
assessment was provided for all aircrew involved.  Aircrews were asked to divide up the 
tasks needed to perform the mission, so that no one individual was performing the entire 
mission.  This division of labor in aircrew task management can be seen in the pre-
emptive HARM shot and jamming tasks.  The pilot’s workload for the pre-emptive 
HARM shot was higher than the ECMO due to having to maneuver the aircraft on a time 
line, in order to make the shot.  The jamming tasks were higher for the ECMO than the 
pilot, as well as the reactive HARM shot; as a result of the ECMO utilizing the HARM 
reactive launch procedure on the aft seat HOTAS.   
 Level 1 (Figure 28) did not include failures and the situational air picture was well 
presented to the operators at all times.  Even with the added functionality of HARM and 
some CCS added for this assessment, the overall highest workload rating was not any 
higher than the DAG 2 level 1 results.   
DAG 3 LEVEL 2 
 Level 2 (Figure 29) injected failures into the scenario with the intent of increasing 
the workload.  The end result of the assessment showed a decrease in workload overall.  
The division of task sharing can still be seen in the results, including the pilots taking 
more of a role in the reactive HARM.  Most crews gave all or most HARM tasks to the 
pilot while the ECMO took all responsibility for jamming.  The decrease in workload 
rating overall appeared to be a result of training.  By this workload assessment, the crews  
 
Figure 28: DAG 3 AVERAGE LEVEL 1 TLX 
Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew 
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005 
 
 
 
Figure 29: DAG 3 AVERAGE LEVEL 2 TLX 
Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew 
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005 
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had been provided four hours of training and the two hour workload assessment level 1.  
The fear was that as the operators became more familiar with both the design and the  
scenario tasks that the workload rating decreased.  As a result, more training was 
provided to the crews prior to the DAG 4 workload assessment.  A different scenario was 
utilized for the level 2 vice level 1 assessment to help reduce the impacts of prior 
knowledge of the scenario influencing the workload rating. 
DAG 4 LEVEL 1 AND 2 
 By DAG 4, the human factors team had made several changes in the process of 
workload assessment.  The first was to use two different scenarios for the two levels of 
assessment (Figure 30 and Figure 31).  This helped to reduce the familiarity with the 
scenario and any impact to the workload assessment.  The second was to provide more 
training to the aircrew.  More training was implemented to reduce the impacts of the 
operator not being familiar with the design on the workload rating.  The design was to be 
in the final IOC configuration by this workload assessment; however a number of display 
formats and functionality had not been implemented in NCOC 3.  Because of this, the 
workload assessment was ruled inconclusive by the program office.   
 However, the assessment did provide suggestions for the design to help the 
workload ratings decrease in the long run.  It also gave a glimpse at the workload rating 
for a different mission area, the modified escort jamming support and the Close Air 
Support (CAS) jamming missions.  CAS jamming is renowned as being the most difficult 
mission area the EA-6B aircrews have to perform with the current ICAP systems.  It also 
showed that frustration and performance were the highest factors that influenced the 
overall workload, which was assessed as being a result of the incomplete simulator 
implementation of the design that did not allow the aircrew to fulfill the mission.  The 
level 2 numbers showed the expected slight increase in workload rating due to the added 
failures introduced into the scenario.   
AVERAGE WORKLOAD FOR JAMMING 
 When the data reported for those tasks that required jamming is compared, the 
results showed a positive trend of decreasing workload ratings (Figure 32) over the four  
 
Figure 30: DAG 4 AVERAGE LEVEL 1 TLX 
Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew 
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: DAG 4 AVERAGE LEVEL 2 TLX 
Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew 
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005 
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0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
DAG 2 L1 DAG 2 L2 DAG 3 L1 DAG 3 L2 DAG 4 L1 DAG 4 L2
W
or
kl
oa
d Pilot
ECMO
Linear (ECMO)
Linear (Pilot)
Minor Compensation
Significant Compensation
 
Figure 32: AVERAGE WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR JAMMING TASKS 
 
DAG evaluations.  The overall workload rating to perform a mission has decreased over 
time; however the workload rating still exceeds the goal of minor compensation level.   
Even though the specific tasks for each scenario were not always the same, the 
comparison of the overall mission workload demonstrated the benefits of improvements 
made from each previous DAG in helping to reduce the overall workload.  Figure 32 
illustrates a fairly flat pilot workload rating throughout the three DAGs.  This helps to 
demonstrate the successful characteristics of the pilot vehicle interface of the F/A-18 
design.  The ECMO workload started higher than anticipated and then decreased 
significantly with the implementation of design changes that effected workload.   
ANALYSIS OF ECMO WORKLOAD 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 illustrate the composite workload for the ECMO in the 
EA-18G design for the three assessments, at both difficulty levels.  The level 1 results 
show that the workload for the DAG 2 design was higher than the minor compensation 
level desired.  As the DAG 3 design was assessed, it incorporated suggested changes to 
the DAG 2 design that were implemented to lower the operator workload.  The DAG 3  
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Figure 33: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR ECMO LEVEL 1 ASSESSMENTS 
 
 
Composite Workload for DAG Level 2 TLXs (ECMOs)
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Figure 34: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR ECMO LEVEL 2 ASSESSMENTS 
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level 1 results for workload were unfortunately higher as a result of the newly added, and 
never seen, design functionality.  Even with the inconclusive results obtained during 
DAG 4, the average workload for the DAG 4 design was lower than that of the DAG 3 
design.  This is an indication that the design change recommendations made during the 
DAG 3 assessment helped to reduce the workload for the new design additions.   
The level 2 results indicate a similar trend.  The design change recommendations 
that were made following DAG 2, significantly reduced the workload required to perform 
the similar tasks in the DAG 3 assessment.  Unlike the level 1 results, the level 2 results 
do show a negative trend with increasing workload ratings with the DAG 4 results.  It 
was determined that this increase in workload rating was a direct result of the operator 
being influenced by the simulation issues that were present in the DAG 4 
implementation.  There was an increase in both the mental and frustration levels required 
to perform the tasks successfully and to attend to the failures induced in the simulation.   
ANALYSIS OF PILOT WORKLOAD 
Figure 35 and Figure 36 illustrate the composite workload for the pilot in the EA-18G 
design for the three assessments, at both difficulty levels.  The level 1 workload values 
were higher than the level 2 values reported.  It was determined that as a result of the 
pilot taking on more responsibility for the more unfamiliar complex tasks, their workload 
ratings increased.  The pilots in the EA-6B community, while knowing the mission, do 
not perform the more complex tasks of electronic surveillance or jamming.  Because of 
this, when the pilots took on the new unfamiliar tasks, there was a learning curve that 
took place at each assessment.  By the time the level 2 assessment occurred, the pilots 
were familiar enough with the new task that the workload results reflected the actual 
design implementation. 
The DAG 4 results for the pilots were no higher than those of the DAG 3 results.  Even 
with the inconclusive assessment due to simulator issues, a positive trend can be assumed 
with the pilot results.  Design inputs and changes implemented to help reduce the 
workload throughout the design iteration did help maintain the workload at or near the  
  
Figure 35: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR PILOT LEVEL 1 ASSESSMENTS 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR PILOT LEVEL 2 ASSESSMENTS 
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previous assessment, even though new design functionality and increased task loading 
was occurring at each assessment.  The pilot workload ratings for all tasks at the level 2  
difficulty, while not below, are very close to the desired minor compensation required for 
system workload. 
COMMON TASKS 
 When the human factors team developed the scenarios for the workload 
assessments they designed the scenarios around similar tasks for the various missions.  
This was an attempt to allow a comparison of results throughout the multiple 
assessments.  Figure 37 illustrates the common tasks that were assessed with the 
composite workload values for all pilots and ECMOs for each task during the three DAG 
assessments.  The higher values for the receive CAS message task were determined to be 
a result of the many simulator issues during DAG 4.  The other tasks, while not all below 
the minor compensation level desired, were all below the significant compensation 
required.  The pilot workload rating tends to be lower than the minor compensation 
required and can be a result of the integration of the pilot into a mission unlike they have 
been in the past with the EA-6B.  The tasks the ECMOs performed were more of the 
complex EW tasks than those the pilot performed.  The comparisons of these same tasks 
with the results for similar tasks from the ICAP II and III surveys (Figure 38) 
demonstrate a positive trend in not only equaling but also reducing the workload required 
to perform the task.  The ICAP II and III surveys were not all inclusive and there were 
tasks that were never evaluated.  For those tasks that were evaluated in the survey, the 
results from the DAG assessments demonstrate that the workload required for the EA-
18G design was lower than that of the EA-6B.   
 
Figure 37: COMPOSITE WORKLOAD FOR COMMON TASKS  
 
 
 
Figure 38: COMPARISON OF COMPOSITE WORKLOAD RATINGS BY SPECIFIC TLX 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
CONCLUSIONS 
The implementation of the advanced cockpit simulation in the early stages of the 
EA-18G design provided a multitude of benefits to the program.  It allowed the human 
factors team to identify the higher risk areas of workload in the design much earlier and 
provided focus for the workload assessments to answer the question of whether the two 
aircrew system can perform the mission.  With this knowledge, the design was able to 
continually be corrected to ensure the workload levels did not increase, or if they did, that 
methods were introduced to reduce the workload during the next assessment.  Even 
though the final successful workload assessment has not been completed, the design of 
the EA-18G system is at a much lower workload level than when it started and should 
provide the operators a very efficient means of completing the Electronic Warfare 
mission. 
Crew coordination issues were discovered early on through the use of the NCOC 
3 simulation.  With the help of the workload assessments, the analysis of the results has 
allowed program management to realize the necessity of pilot integration into the 
Electronic Warfare mission.  The typical training track for pilots in the EA-6B 
community trains the pilots in EW, but does it at a lesser quantity and quality than that of 
the ECMO, due to the limited interaction the pilot actually has with the weapon system in 
the ICAP II and III.  With the design and implementation of the EA-18G, it has been 
proven that the pilot is going to be just as important as the ECMO in completing the EA 
mission.   This has had impacts on the training process and timeline of a pilot for this new 
platform and community.   
The advanced simulation helped recognize those areas overlooked from 
implementation and integration of the ICAP III system into the EA-18G and the areas 
where the implementation of the new design features had been incorrect.  If the program 
had relied on paper-only planning to provide sufficient coverage of the design, it is quite 
possible that the engineering interpretation of the requests and needs of the operators 
would have led to failure to produce a viable system for the end user.  The use of the 
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simulation helped to discover software coding issues very early in the design.  It also 
allowed for training to be provided to the new industry partner, Boeing, in the world of 
Electronic Warfare.  Without this training, the industry team misconceptions of how the 
systems should perform would have propagated into the test and evaluation of the system, 
potentially leading to disputes between the program management of all concerned.   
The advanced simulation provided a means to train the new members on the 
government team as well.  The balancing of multiple major programs concurrently (the 
ICAP III test program completing while the EA-18G program began) made it difficult to 
bring all of the flight test team on board for the early design of the system.  A select few 
led the way and helped interpret the requirements for the industry, while the remainder of 
the team came onboard later.  With the advanced simulation already laid out in NCOC 3, 
training the new engineering support personnel on what to expect from the design when it 
reaches flight test, became easier than just simply relying on their interpretation of the 
written word.  This was extremely important for those who had not been a part of the 
ICAP III test team.   
After convening multiple DAGs to refine the simulation to provide the correct 
presentation of the government’s expectations, the simulation provided a baseline for the 
lab testing of software for the aircraft.  The software coders were able to begin 
programming the real mission computer software while relying on the NCOC 3 
simulation as a tool in helping to define their interpretation of the design.  While the 
simulation will never completely capture the true characterization of the systems, it did 
provide a valid picture of the integration that was required to occur for all the systems to 
work together successfully.   
The advanced simulation of the design has allowed the test community another 
asset in the development of testing procedures and ideas, such as Use Cases.  Use Cases 
allowed the human factors team to “identify mission areas that were significant with 
respect to aircrew workload levels” (Reference 10) and develop new means to identify 
ways of reducing the workload in those areas.  It provided a means to validate the newly 
implemented Use Case process for flight test and provide a means for engineers to 
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validate their requirements and procedures for ground and flight testing.  As each new 
test procedure is developed, the simulation of the design in NCOC 3 can be used to 
validate the procedure without waiting for an actual aircraft.  This will help to ensure that 
the procedures are sound and take less time away for verification of those procedures, 
during the already short flight test program.   
The ability to view the limitations and characteristics of the crew vehicle interface 
early on in the design, coupled with the existing knowledge of the characteristics of those 
systems already on the ICAP III and F/A-18F aircraft, allowed the program to develop a 
baseline for tactics that are not typically started until much later in the program.   In other 
programs, the development of tactics occurs after an extensive and lengthy Operational 
Evaluation (OPEVAL) period.  With the capability to start this process earlier, with the 
help of the advanced simulation, the program hopes to simply verify the developed tactics 
during a shorter OPEVAL period.  This will allow the program to take less time and 
money away from crucial flight test on the integration of the systems. 
While the simulation of the design provided these benefits, it did not provide a 
look at the true characterization of the system to be tested and has potentially skewed the 
mental picture that the program members have of the systems expected performance; the 
largest area of misperception resulting from the display of threats on the TSD.  In the 
simulation, the threat environment is just that, a simulation.  The picture that is displayed 
to the operator does not contain any flaws or imperfections that are anticipated with the 
actual system performance and integration of an EW weapon system into an aircraft.  
Some of the testers and engineers on the program have no concept of this perception, 
leading to the potential of the design not being fully capable or robust enough to handle 
the true characterization of the system.  A certain amount of this is to be expected, 
considering simulation of the real world electromagnetic spectrum is a very difficult, if 
not impossible, task to accomplish.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results seen from using the NCOC 3 simulation to identify and 
reduce the aircrew workload on the EA-18G design, the author recommends that further 
 53 
  
development of the design be performed with the use of the same simulation efforts.  The 
NCOC 3 simulation can continue to be used to support the development of tactics and 
training, at much less cost than operating flight test aircraft.  Future NAVAIR system 
integration programs should view advanced simulation techniques as a successful means 
of integrating software design requirements with operator expectations.   
The author recommends continuing to involve operators in the early design 
iterations of new systems and software.  Early and iterative involvement of operator input 
into the design of aviation systems can provide valuable information to the engineering 
team for the design.  The process of DAGs and simulation events for operator evaluations 
can help not only train the engineering team in the mission and the requirements, but also 
help to realize any potential design implementation issues.  Design iterations performed 
on power point are subject to individual interpretation, while simulation of the actual 
software presents the true characterization of the design.    
Using simulation for early human factors evaluations for new design integration 
can help reduce the amount of higher priced flight test required. While it will never 
completely eliminate the need for flight testing the interface in the real world 
environment, especially when interacting with the electromagnetic spectrum, it can 
provide a much earlier look at the flaws and issues created by higher workload tasks 
within in the system.     
A process of selecting the correct aircrew to evaluate the human factors 
implications (workload) of a new design is crucial.  The military spends millions of 
dollars training aircrew in a particular specialty that should be utilized to the fullest 
potential.  While all Test Pilot School graduates are taught to be as diverse in evaluating 
designs as possible, nothing can take the place of experience.  The selection of future 
aircrew to perform simulation evaluations should be placed around a diverse approach.  
The compliment of evaluators should be comprised of test oriented personnel with a 
specialty in the field of use for the new system (i.e., distinguish between EW and air-to-
air warfare) and personnel that have the tactical experience required in the system area, 
who may not have any test experience.   
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Integration of new and potentially combined rating scales that pertain more 
directly to the needs of the program can add focus and concentrate the efforts of the 
evaluators.  The overall cookbook process that has been laid out in methods such as 
Cooper-Harper and the Bedford scales can act as the road map to follow, while changing 
the particulars to fit the requirements of the programs efforts.  Test teams should never 
assume that one rating scale fits all needs for evaluation. 
It is recommended by the author that these methods continue to be used to help 
lower the risks to future programs. The lessons learned during the simulation efforts to 
evaluate the task workload in the EA-18G design should be passed onto other NAVAIR 
programs to aid in risk reduction for all programs.  
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Appendix A: FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE A-1 NASA TLX RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS  
REFERENCE: TLX-USER MANUAL 
 
 59  
 
FIGURE A-2 NASA TLX RATING SCALES  
REFERENCE: TLX-USER MANUAL 
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Appendix B: DAG TASK LOAD INDEX  
TABLE B-1: DAG 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS 
(REFERENCE 10) 
 
Workload 
Assessment 
Task 
Level TLX Task Set 
Introduced 
Failures 
Operator 
Task 
1 System start-up, Initialization, BIT 
None System 
Startup 
2 
Establish Situational 
Awareness (task 
that would typically 
be performed 
during Take-off, 
Departure, Climb-
out,) System 
Monitor, COMM,  
None Take-
off/Climb out 
3 
Pre-Push, Join-up, 
Climb, Ingress, 
System Monitor, 
Pre Vulnerable 
JAMMING Task 
None Pod Power up 
4 
Pre-Vulnerable, Pre-
Emptive 
JAMMING 
None Pre-planned 
Jamming 
5 Pre-Vulnerable, Pre-Emptive JAMMING 
None Pre-planned 
Jamming 
6 Pre- Vulnerable, JAMMING Task 
None Jamming 
7 PE Vulnerable, JAMMING Task 
None Jamming 
DAG 2 1 
8 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task, Pop-
up Threat, Abort 
None Pop-up Threat 
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TABLE B-2: DAG 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS AND 
FAILURES 
(REFERENCE 10) 
 
 
Workload 
Assessment 
Task Level TLX Task Set Introduced Failures Operator Task 
1 System start-up, Initialization, BIT 
None System Startup 
2 
Establish Situational 
Awareness (task that 
would typically be 
performed 
during Take-off, 
Departure, Climb-out,) 
System Monitor, COMM, 
EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, No 
Failures 
Take-off/Climb out 
3 
Pre-Push, Join-up, Climb, 
Ingress, System Monitor, 
Pre Vulnerable 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air to Air, 
BIT No 
Failures 
Pod Power up 
4 
Pre-Vulnerable, Pre-
Emptive JAMMING 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, 
Air-to-Air, System 
Monitor, with 
Recoverable Failure 
Pre-planned Jamming
5 
Pre-Vulnerable, Pre-
Emptive JAMMING 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, 
Air-to-Air, System 
Monitor, with 
Recoverable Failure 
Pre-planned Jamming
6 
Pre- Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to- 
Air, System Monitor, 
with Failures 
Jamming 
7 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to- 
Air, Video Record, 
System Monitor, with 
Failures 
Jamming 
DAG 2 2 
8 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task, Pop-up 
Threat, Abort 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
Video Record, System 
Monitor, with Failures 
Pop-up Threat 
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TABLE B-3: DAG 3 LEVEL 1STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS  
(REFERENCE 10) 
 
Workload 
Assessment Task Level TLX Task Set Introduced Failures Operator Task 
1 
System start-up, 
Initialization, 
BIT 
No Failures Start-up 
2 
Establish 
Situational 
Awareness, 
System monitor 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, with 
failures 
Take-off, 
Departure, 
Climb-out 
3 
Pre-push, Join-
up, Climb, 
ingress, System 
Monitor, Pre-
Vulnerable 
Jamming Task 
Set-up 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air to Air, 
BIT No Failures 
Join-up with 
Strike Package 
4 
Pre-vulnerable, 
Pre-emptive 
HARM, Pre-
Emptive 
Jamming 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
jamming source failures. 
Pre-Emptive 
HARM 
5 
Pre-Vulnerable, 
Pre-Emptive 
JAMMING, 
Reactive 
JAMMING 
COMM, EMI, 
MIDS Degradation, Air-to-
Air, System Monitor, with 
No Failures 
Pre-emptive 
Jamming 
6 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Source Failure 
Reactive Jamming 
7 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
Video Record, System 
Monitor, No Failures 
Jamming 
8 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task, 
Reactive HARM 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
Video Record, System 
Monitor, No Failures 
Pop-up Threat 
Reactive HARM 
Shot 
9 
Post-Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to- 
Air, Video Record, System 
Monitor, with No Failures 
Post vulnerable 
DAG 3 Level 1 
10 
Post-Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task, 
A/A 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Airto- 
Air, Video Record, System 
Monitor, Source Failure 
Air-to-Air Threat 
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TABLE B-4: DAG 3 LEVEL 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS 
(REFERENCE 10) 
  
Workload 
Assessment 
Task Level TLX Task Set Introduced Failures Operator Task
1 
System start-up, 
Initialization, BIT, 
MDB Reload 
No Failures Start-up 
2 
Establish 
Situational 
Awareness System 
Monitor 
COMM, EMI, 
MIDS Degradation, with 
No Failures 
Take-off, 
Departure, 
Climb-out 
3 
Pre-Push, Join-up, 
Climb, Ingress, 
System Monitor, 
Pre Vulnerable 
JAMMING Task 
Set-up 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air to Air, 
BIT with Power Failure. 
(Rolex 5)
 
 
Join-up with 
Strike Package 
4 
Pre-Vulnerable, 
Pre-Emptive 
HARM, Pre-
Emptive 
JAMMING 
COMM, EMI, 
MIDS Degradation, Air-
to-Air, System Monitor, 
with Source Failure 
Pre-Emptive 
HARM 
5 
Pre-Vulnerable, 
Pre-Emptive 
JAMMING, 
Reactive 
JAMMING 
COMM, EMI, 
MIDS Degradation, Air-
to-Air, System Monitor, 
with Source Failure 
 
Pre-emptive 
Jamming 
6 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Source Failure 
Jamming 
7 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
Video Record, System 
Monitor, with Source 
Failure 
 
Jamming 
8 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task, 
Pop-up Threat, 
Reactive HARM
COMM, 
EMI, MIDS Degradation, 
Air-to-Air, Video Record, 
System Monitor, with 
No Failures 
Pop-up Threat 
Reactive HARM 
Shot 
9 
Post-Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to- 
Air, Video Record, 
System Monitor, with 
Power Failure 
Post vulnerable 
DAG 3 Level 2 
10 
Post-Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, Air-to-Air 
Engagement, Video 
Record, System Monitor, 
with Source Failure 
Air-to-Air Threat
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TABLE B-5: DAG 4 LEVEL 1 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS 
(REFERENCE 10) 
 
Workload 
Assessment 
Task 
Level TLX Task Set Introduced Failures Operator Task 
1 On Deck, system start-up, Initialization, BIT, 
POD Load Fail 
 
Start-up, with POD 
failure 
2 
Establish Situational 
Awareness, System 
Monitor,  
MATT, Resolve 
Ambiguities 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation 
Climb-out 
New MATT ID 
3 
Pre-Push, Join-up, Climb, 
Ingress, System Monitor, 
Pre Vulnerable 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air to Air, BIT 
No Failures 
Pre-Push 
4 
Pre-Vulnerable, Pre-
Emptive JAMMING 
 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, Coordinate 
Jamming Assignments due 
to Aft Source Failure 
Pre-Emptive 
Jamming  
Failed Jamming 
Source 
5 
Pre-Vulnerable, 
JAMMING 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, Pre-
Planned HARM with 
Failures 
Pre-emptive 
HARM shot 
6 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air 
Threat (Avoidance), System 
Monitor, with Source 
Failure 
Air-to-Air Slide 
7 
Pre-Vul, Receipt of CAS COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Failures 
Receive CAS 
message 
8 
Pre-Vul COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
CCS SOI Record, System 
Monitor, HARM Fail, with 
Failures 
Record SOI 
9 
Pre-Vul, Confirm 
JAMMING Assignments 
(including CCS) 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Failures 
CAS Setup 
10 
Pre-Vul, JAMMING 
Task, A/A 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, HARM 
Fail pass HARM package to 
wingman, Source Failure 
HARM Pass HHO 
DAG 4 Level 1 
11 
PE Vulnerable, 
JAMMING Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, Source 
Failure 
CAS Alignment 
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TABLE B-6: DAG 4 LEVEL 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS 
(REFERENCE 10) 
 
Workload 
Assessment 
Task 
Level TLX 
Task Set Introduced Failures Operator Task 
1 
System start-up, 
Initialization, BIT, MDB 
Reload 
No Failures Start-up 
2 
Establish Situational 
Awareness, System 
Initialization and Monitor, 
Ambiguity resolution 
No Failures Pre-push, Join up 
resolve ambiguity 
3 
Pre-Push, Join-up, Climb-
out, Ingress, System 
Monitor, Verify Jamming 
Assignments, Resolve 
ambiguities 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air to Air, BIT 
with Antenna Failure 
Push 
4 
Pre-Vulnerable, Confirm 
Assignments (including 
CCS) Jamming 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Antenna Failure 
Confirm 
assignments, CCS 
threats 
5 
PE-Vulnerable, Jamming, 
Pre-Planned HARM 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Antenna and Source 
Failure 
Pre-emptive 
HARM shot 
6 
PE Vulnerable, Jamming 
Task, ID and Record SOI 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Antenna and Source Failure 
ID, Record SOI  
7 
PE Vulnerable, Jamming 
Task, ID Abort Threat 
 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
Video Record, System 
Monitor, with Antenna and 
Source Failure 
Big Dog 
8 
Pre-Vulnerable, Receive 
CAS and Load route, 
Receive HARM package 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Antenna and Source Failures 
Receive CAS 
9 
PE Vulnerable, HARM, 
Jamming Task 
COMM, EMI, MIDS 
Degradation, Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Source Failure 
Pop-up threat, 
Reactive HARM 
shot 
DAG 4 Level 2 
10 
A/A Leaker ID COMM, Engage Air-to-Air, 
System Monitor, with 
Antenna and Source Failures 
A/A Intercept, 
AMRAAM shot 
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Appendix C: WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE QUESTION  
The following questionnaire is an example taken from the workload assessments 
performed (Reference 10). 
 
2. Establish Situational Awareness (task that would typically be performed during Take-
off, Departure, Climb-out,) System Initialization and Monitor, Ambiguity resolution, 
COMM, EMI, MIDS Degradation, with No Failures. 
 
Describe your performance criteria for this task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circle one of each of the paired workload factors. 
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2. Establish Situational Awareness (task that would typically be performed during 
Take-off, Departure, Climb-out,) System Initialization and Monitor, Ambiguity 
resolution, COMM, EMI, MIDS Degradation, with No Failures. 
 
On the scale of 1 through 10, rate (mark) the magnitude of each workload 
factor.  Use the modified Bedford Cooper-Harper rating scale (below) and 
the example definitions (left) to form your response. 
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1 Low tasking, safe, can 
accept additional tasks 
without impacting 
existing tasks. 
2 Minimal tasking, safe, 
can accept additional 
tasks without impacting 
existing tasks. 
3 Light tasking, safe, can 
accept additional 
taskings with minimum 
impact to existing 
taskings. 
4 Moderate / Comfortable 
tasking, safe, can 
accept additional 
tasking and complete 
all tasks with reduced 
revisit time. 
5 Moderate / pressured 
tasking, safety slightly 
impacted, additional 
tasks will impact 
/degrade existing tasks. 
6 High tasking, safety 
impacted, things 
beginning to drop out of 
scan, additional tasking 
will significantly 
degrade new and 
existing tasks. 
7 High tasking, safety 
secondary 
consideration, 
additional tasking will 
override or replaced 
some existing tasks. 
8 Very high tasking, 
safety not factored into 
tasks completion, 
additional tasks cannot 
be accepted without 
major degradation to all 
existing tasks.  
9 Saturation tasking, 
safety not considered, 
scan breaking down, 
additional tasking will 
impact mission 
accomplishment. 
10 Total saturation 
tasking, scan and task 
sharing breakdown, 
fixation on task at hand, 
survival instincts take 
over. 
   1       2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
 
 
 
 
2. Establish Situational Awareness (task that would typically be performed during 
Take-off, Departure, Climb-out,) System Initialization and Monitor, Ambiguity 
resolution, COMM, EMI, MIDS Degradation, with No Failures. 
 
Ratings Summary  
 
 
 
Weighted Rating 
Scale Weight Raw Adjusted Rating 
Mental 
Physical 
Temporal 
Performance 
Effort 
Frustration 
Sum of Adjusted 
Weighted 
 
 
 
 
 
If any of your ratings were “4” or greater, please describe the cause. 
Consider: 
• Design/Mechanization   
• Scenario 
• Training/Proficiency 
• Simulator Anomalies 
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Appendix D: USE CASE EXAMPLE 
  73  
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Appendix E: CRITICAL MISSION TASKS 
 76  
The following information was obtained from the EA-18G Human Engineering Crew 
Vehicle Interface Report, reference 10. 
Mission Analysis/Decomposition 
(EA-18G Critical Task Identification) 
 
Mission Tasking 
1. Review Air tasking Order (ATO) - Created by CAOC and intelligence 
2. Review Air Plan---CV Airwing Operations generated document 
3. Review Flight schedule - Squadron generated document using information from the 
Air Plan 
4. Strike lead generates Strike (mission) plan 
5. Element leads generate individual sub-mission plans 
 
Mission Planning 
6. Aircrew coordinate with intelligence to develop a mission plan using the following 
considerations:* 
a. Required weapons based on theater threat 
b. Site, System, and Emitter mission planned MDB 
c. Coordinated SEAD and Strike group routes, timing, positioning 
d. Develop waypoints, safe areas, and geographical restrictions 
7. Element leads integrate mission plans into overall Strike plan 
8. CAG approves entire strike plan. Strike lead responsible for understanding all 
individual elements 
 
Mission Briefings 
9. All aircrew, intelligence, and CV Operations personnel attend mass strike brief 
10. SEAD, DEAD, and EA aircrew attend SEAD element brief. 
11. Individual crews brief their mission roles 
 
Pre-Flight/Before Engine Start 
12. Aircrew review aircraft maintenance log 
13. Aircrew check out tapes / data cards / classified material 
14. Aircrew don flight gear 
15. Aircrew “walk” to aircraft 45 minutes prior to launch. 
16. Aircrew receive pass down from previous pilot and plane captain 
17. Aircrew man crewstations. 
18. Aircrew load encrypted radio (assume EA-6B) 
19. Aircrew “zeroize” encrypted radio. Ground crew re-keys radio. (assume EA-6B) 
20. Aircrew close cockpit canopies 
21. Aircrew receive flight deck, air boss, and strike instructions 
 
Engine Start 
22. Start engines 30 minutes prior to launch 
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Before Taxi 
23. Aircrew ensure MDBs load, computers are BITed and “up” 
24. Aircrew check aircraft engines and controls 
25. Aircrew power up and op-check AEA systems* 
26. Aircrew initiate a POD identification and ensure communication with the AEA 
system* 
27. Aircrew check in with element lead; Aircrew check in with strike lead 
 
Before Taxi/Before Takeoff 
28. Taxi to directed catapult 
29. Take off 
 
After Take Off 
30. Climb to required altitude. 
31. Check out through Strike and Red Crown 
32. Make necessary “burn out” jamming assignments and “burn” transmitters out in order 
to check status* 
33. Turn on Master RAD* 
 
Air Refueling 
34. Turn off Master RAD* 
35. Fly to tanker (if required) 
36. Rendezvous on tanker 
37. Refuel to top off tanks 
 
Prior to Rendezvous Pt/Combat Checks 
38. Depart Tanker 
39. Rendezvous with strike group, check in as fragged 
40. Optimize AEA jamming assignments* 
a. Ensure accuracy, steering, priority, Protected Entity* 
41. Conduct EMCON procedures as briefed 
42. Minimize radio activity 
43. Execute mission plan, phase transitions, and jammer gameplan* 
44. Verify Stores (weapons programs)* 
 
Push 
45. Push on time 
46. Listen for appropriate Code words / monitor proper MIDS NPG 
47. Master RAD on per strike brief/mission plan* 
48. Broadcast appropriate code words at appropriate times* 
49. Evaluate/manage incoming emitters* ** 
50. Resolve Ambiguous emitter activity ** 
51. Be alert for pop-up threats* ** 
52. Monitor timeline* 
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53. Monitor and fix transmitter power problems* 
54. Constantly evaluate go/no-go criteria* 
55. Monitor transmitter steering and power output* 
56. Fly mission planned course* 
57. Listen for appropriate Code words* 
58. Employ Weapons* ** 
a. Air to Ground 
b. Air to Air 
 
Post Combat Checks 
59. Master RAD off* 
60. Go through RTB (Return To Base) waypoints 
61. Return to tanker as fragged 
62. Pods on standby* 
63. Have wingman conduct battle damage checks on aircraft 
64. Pre landing checks (items included but not limited to: pod power to “off”, all 
unnecessary boxes off, etc.)* 
65. Go through carrier group check points 
66. Check in with Red Crown and Strike 
 
Marshall 
67. Marshall overhead at appropriate altitude during the day, or assigned marshall 
location at night. 
 
Before Landing 
68. In marshall, adjust gross weight if necessary (dump fuel), hook down 
69. Pass maintenance codes to maintenance 
70. Conduct landing checks (e.g. landing gear down, hook down, harness locked, etc. 
These checks can be found in 
current E/F books.) 
71. Land 
72. OK 3 wire arrested landing 
 
After Landing 
73. Come to stop and follow flight deck handler directions. 
74. Once chocked and chained secure engines or begin hot refuel. 
75. Exit aircraft and conduct post-flight inspection of aircraft 
 
Post Flight/Debriefing 
76. Pass down important information to relief aircrew 
a. Debrief time sensitive Intel information 
77. Crew goes to maintenance* 
a. Debrief time sensitive maintenance information 
78. Get out of flight gear 
79. Debrief Operations* 
a. Inform Ops of time sensitive info 
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b. Inform Ops of flight time and mission/training accomplishments 
80. Return tapes/data cards to the ready room 
81. Attend Element Debrief 
Attend Strike debrief 
82. Attend Crew debrief 
 
* EA-18G Human Engineering Essential Mission Tasks = Tasks that if not properly 
completed within specified criteria 
could result in degraded mission effectiveness. 
 
** EA-18G Human Engineering Mission Critical Tasks (typically involve HOTAS) = 
Tasks that if not properly completed 
within specified criteria result in mission failure. 
 
Note: Time and accuracy criteria for EA-18G Human Engineering Mission Essential and 
Human Engineering Mission 
Critical tasks are documented in the individual EA-18G Use Cases. 
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